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Former chief strategist to President Clinton, Dick Morris was once described in Time magazine as the most influential private citizen in America. He has worked in election campaigning for over twenty years and was political advisor to Clinton in 1978 when he was Arkansas governor. As special advisor to President Clinton, Morris met with him on a regular basis in the Treaty Room at the White House. Morris had worked with Richard Scruggs on asbestos litigation. When Scruggs told him of his intention to sue tobacco companies, Morris conducted a poll in Mississippi to weigh public reaction. Morris had personal reasons for wanting to sue the tobacco industry. In September 1993, Morris' mother, a lifelong smoker, died of cancer. Morris was also born two pounds 11 ounces premature and almost died because his mother chain-smoked during her pregnancy. Morris asked Scruggs for help in convincing the President that this was a good issue. Scruggs paid for a poll in the five tobacco states (North Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee). It showed that the public was strongly against teen smoking and tobacco was a major health concern. After seeing the poll data, President Clinton decided to act. He proposed new anti-tobacco regulations that would restrict marketing to children and give the FDA the authority to determine if nicotine was an addictive drug. FRONTLINE interviewed Dick Morris in January 1998. Q. Could you explain, given your political expertise and background, how dangerous was it before, let's say 1994, for a politician, someone like Mike Moore to take on the tobacco industry. Morris: I believe that there were three sort of protected industries in America that everybody agreed you don't touch. The Mob, the tobacco companies and the beer companies. The beer companies still are sacrosanct, they get away with it. Reagan was very aggressive in cracking down on the Mob and the other--and that's followed. But tobacco enjoyed a charmed life in American politics until about the mid-1990s and the assumption was that you could never take them on. That they were absolutely the giants of American politics. You just didn't mess with heavyweights. Remember the old stuff about Jim Brown. You don't spit on Superman's cape--you know walk on Superman's cape, you don't spit into the wind, you don't mess with the Lone Ranger, you don't fool around with Jim. Well, that's how people I think felt about the tobacco companies. And the irony of that was that it took a--a pygmy to take them on because the giants were too scared. That is the courage of Mike Moore to do that. Q. So to politicians, the tobacco industry was Darth Vader? Morris: Yes. It was the source of a vast amount of money, an incredible amount of advertising. Erskine Bowles told me when we were considering the tobacco initiative, "Don't pick on somebody that spends six billion a year in advertising." And you know that was--that made some good sense. Q. So it took a pygmy as you put it. The pygmy is Mike Moore. Morris: The giants turned away and it took one man who believed that he could use the court system to bring about justice. The beauty of our court system is that anybody can enter the court and sue. Uh, you have to be appointed to be in the Executive Branch. You have to be elected to be in the Legislative Branch, but anybody can go into court. And Mike Moore basically said, "I'm anybody, and I've got basically a free lawyer in Dick Scruggs who's willing to front all the money that's required and all the time and all the energy and uh I'm willing to do it." And the beauty of this, the amazing thing about it is this was such a incredibly courageous idea and it took me so long personally to understand what he was doing. That he was suing over Medicaid. It was just uh, a very unusual idea. And he really singlehandedly brought about the changes that are going on the country today. And he did it, not as Attorney General. He did it as just a regular plaintiff. Q. You said you had a hard time understanding it at first. Do you remember when it was explained to you? Morris: I had been working with Scruggs on some of the asbestos litigation he had been doing and uh, he called me and he said, "I'm going to go after tobacco." And I said, "Well, great. But what's, but, most people are losing in these smoker lawsuits. They don't believe that the cigarette companies have liability about people who have died as a result of smoking." He said, "No. We have a new theory. The State of Mississippi is going to sue and to say that the tobacco companies owe us money for the people who we've been treating for lung cancer and emphysema and heart disease and that the cigarette companies should pay for that treatment." And I said, "You mean actually charge them for the treatment?" And he said, "Yeah." And I said, "Under what theory?" And he said, "Well, the theory of any liability, that their misbehavior, and their selling products that kill people caused this liability and that they should be required to pay for it." And it was a fascinating theory. So I said, "Well, I don't know if anybody's going to buy that, but that's incredible." And he said, "Well, why don't you do a poll on it?" So I did a poll in Mississippi and I outlined it to people. And at first blush we got 55 that agreed and 40 that opposed. Q. Fifty-five that agreed to what? Morris: We had 55 percent that said that tobacco companies should pay and 40 percent that said that they shouldn't. And after we went through the argumentation on both sides, pro and against-- Q. In your poll. Morris: In the poll. Q. So you went down to New Orleans to do what? Morris: Well, Scruggs asked me to meet with all of the anti-smoking lawyers, to test the viability of this weird idea of suing over Medicaid. And I went to them and showed them the poll that we'd done in Mississippi. And the poll showed that about 55 percent of the people, off the first blush would vote for the plaintiff's position that the tobacco companies would have to pay, and that with some arguments on both sides for and against, you could get it up to 65 percent. And I said, "Hey, if you need three-quarters of a jury to win this, maybe you can." Because there clearly is good, solid public consensus. And the data showed that the people really believed--number one that smoking caused these diseases; but number two, they also believed that these cigarette companies were targeting kids. They had absolutely no doubt that the purpose of cigarette advertising was to go after the kids and that was a very, very important element of it, of making this whole case work. Q.What was your sense of Dick Scruggs? Morris: I thought that he was a regular lawyer, litigating to make money and that he had this really good thing going because there were so many people that were sick from asbestos in this--the area of Mississippi where the shipyard was. You know, he was doing very well financially. But then as he became more involved in tobacco, I began to realize that this was not a profit-making thing on his part. This was a holy crusade. This was sort of something he was dedicating his life to. And uh, I really believe, and came to believe that if he didn't make a penny out of this uh, it would be fine for him. I think he made all the money he would need for the rest of his life in the asbestos litigation. And I think he basically decided he would dedicate it to fighting tobacco. I think Dick Scruggs is probably one of the most idealistic people I know. He puts the rest of us to shame. Q. This is coming from hard-nosed Dick Morris. What can--was there an incident, something happened that convinced you that this guy wasn't in it for the money or just to win? Morris: Well, a lot of times as we talked about the proposed tobacco settlement, I would say I thought a real vulnerability here was the attorneys' fees and--because they were pretty large. And I said, "The tobacco companies and people will pick on that aspect of it, and, and they'll pick it to death." And he said, "Well, look, as far as I'm concerned, I don't care if I make a dime off of this. I don't care if I lose money, for the millions that we've put out in this thing. I'm just determined to see this through." And at first I just thought that was a speech. But then, the more we talked about the formula and who would get what and how that would work, it became very clear that he literally was willing to make nothing from it. Literally. Q. So you believe that Dick Scruggs is in it for the issue? Morris: Yeah, idealism isn't fashionable in America these days and it certainly is suspect. But I think that he is one of the truly publicly spirited people around. I think that he decided that he made a lifetime's worth of money off of the asbestos stuff, that he was just going to basically spend the rest of his life fighting tobacco. And if he got money for it, fine. If he didn't get money for it, fine. But he was going to go after it. And you know, he put his whole law practice on hold. He uh, basically stopped taking any other cases. He focused all of his energies and resources on this tobacco litigation. And he didn't have all that good a chance of success. I mean, if he was a pragmatist, he was a pretty stupid pragmatist. There were a lot of better targets he could have--you know, people get hurt in automobile accidents every day. He could have focused on that. Q. So, you took this, in a sense--by the time you went back to the White House, 95... Did you talk to them about this litigation? Did you talk to the President about it? Morris: Yeah. Starting around January or February of 95, I raised with the President the tobacco issue, because I thought Henry Waxman, the Congressman from California had done a very fine job of focusing attention on the issue. But then there was kind of the assumption that with the Republican victory that the deregulation, anti-regulation forces were in the driver's seat. And I knew from my polling in Mississippi how strongly people in what's after all is the most conservative state in the country, felt about that issue. So I told the President that I thought this could be a really good issue for us to focus on. Q. Give me a sense of the conversation. You're in his living room, the Oval Office, where are you? Dick Morris: We would meet in the Treaty Room it's called, which is in the President's residence. And it's his office. And there's this huge picture on the wall with William McKinley settling the Spanish American War and behind you there's a picture of Abe Lincoln, an original oil painting of Lincoln and Admiral Farragut and General Sherman and General Grant on a river boat settling the Civil War strategy. And then there's his desk and then there's his book case of his personal book collection. So it's really a heady and a very intimate kind of atmosphere. Q. Subject of the day was? Morris: Well, it was part of our weekly meetings. We'd meet every week, initially alone and then with others. It became kind of a strategy meeting. and I said, "You know, we ought to look at tobacco down the road as an issue we could focus on. And he just kind of grunted. He looked at me and, you know, just nodded and it was kind of lightly and in passing. Then we were looking for issues that we could take the offense on. We were playing defense on school lunches, defense on Head Start, defense on Medicaid, defense on Medicare, defense on education, defense on environment. And we were looking for something--I was looking for something where we could take the offense. Where we could really go out with a new proposal. And as the President was beginning to move towards the center on the balanced budget and stuff like that, I thought just strategically, it would be a good idea to have an issue where we were really going out left. Where we were really being very aggressive and very active. And then, I guess, two influences combined in my mind. One was that I knew from my work with Scruggs how incredibly deeply the American people felt about this stuff. And in September of 1993, just about a year and a half before all this happened my mother died of cancer after a lifetime of smoking and that affected me. And I also personally was born two pounds 11 ounces, premature and almost died and my mother chainsmoked during my pregnancy and had no idea in 1947 that that caused premature birth. So tobacco almost killed me and it killed my mother. So I took it personally. Q. Well, there is this way in this issue, whether you're Hubert Humphrey, with his father, and other people, that there's a personal connection to this issue. Morris: Yeah. And, and I felt it, and I felt that it was politically good. But that really wasn't enough to make it work. That was just kind of the beginning of the process. Q. And this is at the time that the FDA is getting ready to propose regulation of cigarettes? Morris: The FDA's thinking about it. And, um, we're now around March or April or May. Then, um, in early July, the President gave a speech at Georgetown University where he really talked about a values agenda in our politics. He said that we need to basically move from an exclusive focus on dollars and cents to something where we're really focusing on values. And I think that that gave the whole anti-tobacco thing a new spark in terms of the thinking that kind of catalyzed it. Because I think that it--that he was very clear that the anti-tobacco stuff would be kind of the one of the centerpieces of that new agenda. So I think that was, an important part of the calculus. Q. But did he bring up the fact that, "Hey, Dick, tobacco. They're the Darth Vader of politics"? Morris: Well, he was scared to death of losing Kentucky and losing Tennessee because he felt it could get tight in the electoral college when the reelection came. And he felt that this would absolutely wipe him in those two states. And he was a little worried about Georgia, Virginia and North Carolina, but he pretty well figured he wouldn't win those states anyway. But I kept telling him that even in those states, there was a strong probably a strong majority in favor of banning tobacco companies' efforts aimed at kids. You see, at that point, the anti-tobacco cause had not really distinguished adults from children. They had focused on smoking as a whole as being a health issue in general. And the contribution that, I guess, I perhaps had the most to do with was to say that, that voters felt one way about kids and teenagers and another way about adult smoking. When you talk about restrictions on adult smoking, you basically had about 40-50 disagreement--45 on one side, 45 on the other. It was a real split community. But when you talk about restrictions on teen smoking and on advertising to kids and of targeting kids, you have about 80 percent that wanted to crack down hard. And the the funny thing about it, the amazing thing about it is people that have never smoked didn't switch, they were always anti-tobacco. People who had smoked and quit, were always anti-tobacco. So they didn't switch. The difference was smokers, people who were now smoking were almost unanimous against restrictions on adult smoking, but 70 or 80 percent in favor of restrictions on teen smoking. Because they were hooked and they were basically say that "I know that I smoked when I was 12 years old and they were not very sentimental about the process." They are flipping. They gave you the votes that made this politically viable. Q. So Scruggs tells us that you called him at one point and asked him "can you do a poll in the tobacco states, because I need the information for my discussions with Clinton." Morris: That's right. Q.Tell me how that happened. Morris: Well, as it turns out the--I did the poll. Voters absolutely felt that cigarette companies were targeting kids. We asked them in one question, "Do you think cigarette companies advertise to get people to switch brands, to get people to smoke more or to get children to start smoking?" And 80 percent said "children to start smoking" and only 20 percent said the other two answers or weren't sure. They got it. They knew what Joe Camel was about and the Marlboro Man and all that. But the President said, "Okay, well this'll be the issue. But I'll lose two states. I'll get killed in these two states." I remember he once said to me, he said, "I'm going to get a one-day story and I'll lose two states." So I said, "Well--" Q. Was he laughing? Morris: No. He wasn't laughing. He was deadly serious. Because he felt that you know, he would get a nice one-day story and it would look good, and then he'd get killed in two states that he absolutely had to win. So I did a survey in five states... in North Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee, which were the five tobacco states. And we asked people, "Who are you voting for?" And then we said--we talked about the anti-smoking stuff being aimed at kids, and we said, "If Clinton backs this would you vote for him? And we found that in every single one of these states he gained by taking this position, as long as it was aimed at kids, at teenagers. And uh, he was shocked by that. He was absolutely blown away by that. Q. What'd he say? Morris: He was shocked. He said, "In other words, it's not adult smoking, it's teen smoking?" And I said, "Yeah, this is--as far as their concerned, smokers see it as a subset of the drug issue." You know, not the civil liberties issue, and not seatbelts and that kind of stuff. They see it as basically a drug issue and a character issue and it was a whole new perspective for him in that sense. So that was significant, and I think that was very important. But the absolute key intervention was Gore. Because Gore was from Tennessee. And, I remember at the seminal meeting when he really decided to go ahead in early July. We were pondering it and he was thinking about it. Erskine, who usually--Erskine Bowles the current Chief of Staff--who usually was an ally of mine, was here against it because he's from North Carolina. He favored it in principle but he was scared to death of the tobacco companies. He said, "Let's don't go against somebody that spends a billion dollars in advertising." And the President turned to Gore, he President was sitting in a wing chair, in front of the table and Gore was sitting at the edge of the couch, right over here and he turned to Gore after everybody had spoken and he said, "Al, what do you think?" And you know, Gore always speaks like he's giving a Supreme Court opinion. And he said, "Well, Mr. President, the history of this issue goes back, blah-blah-blah and he was, you know, like writing for the Court majority. And he said, "Listen, early in my political career, an issue came up about labeling on the cigarette packs to say this--the health warnings that you see." And he said, "I had to vote on that, and I decided to vote in favor of that. And I thought I was ending my political career." From Tennessee voting in favor of that. And he said, "I would go before tobacco farmers and I would say, "I voted for this because I don't want your kids to smoke. Do you want your kids to smoke?" And he said, "None of the tobacco farmers wanted their kids to smoke. And they really identified with it. They understood it and they voted for me, even though it hurt their economic interests. Because it was their children." And he said, "Mr. President, I am deeply convinced that if you do this, it's not going to hurt you politically, it's not going to cost you Tennessee. It's not going to cost you Kentucky and it's going to be a very important advance for public health." And I think that decided Clinton. Because he wanted to do it anyway, but when the former Senator from Tennessee was saying it's not going to cost you Tennessee, that I think was the decisive moment with him. Q. That's when he let Commissioner Kessler issue his regulations. Morris: Yes. When he endorsed those regulations I think that he--there ensued a couple of weeks there where he was talking with Governor Hunt of North Carolina and was, I think, hoping for a negotiated solution with the tobacco companies. But I think he understood that he wasn't going to get that and that he should go straight ahead. Morris: When Clinton decided to take on tobacco it was really very close to the absolute low point of his presidency. Uh, his popularity was very far down, he had been battered by the Republican Congress which had passed a lot of its programs and um, this was a, this was an act that was taken by a president who was looking at the face of extinction. Uh, whatever you think of Bill Clinton, it's clear that this was the single most courageous moment of his presidency. The single most courageous moment. Q. His willingness to take on the people no one else would ever take on? Morris: Exactly, his willingness to take on this mass collection of power and money and uh, and political clout that the tobacco industry represents. He took on the NRA. The NRA is probably a tenth as potent as the tobacco companies were. He took on the pro-life people. They're probably a tenth as potent as tobacco. To take on the tobacco was just extraordinary. And the interesting thing about it, it is that while he probably came to believe that maybe this wouldn't cost him two states, he sure didn't believe this would help him. Because he didn't really believe that America would get energized about tobacco. It wasn't a national issue. It wasn't a big deal. Nobody was talking about it back then. And, uh, he was kind of rescuing the issue from the dust heap. It had fallen by the way side. Q. Now during this period of time, according to Dick Scruggs, you are the Prime Minister, as he put it. You were talking to Trent Lott. Who was, at one time, or was still your client as well. Morris: At one time was my client, right. Q. Yeah. What was Lott's reaction to all this? Morris: Well, Trent had a weird relationship with Scruggs. Uh, he would always refer to Scruggs as "my no good scum-suckin' brother-in-law." And when I met with him in the future and I wanted to refer to Scruggs, I would say he's the "NGSSBIL" the initials of that "no good scum-suckin' brother-in-law." So he kind of saw Scruggs as this crazy Liberal who he was related to by marriage. Who he liked a great deal. He had a very real affection for him. But Trent uh, didn't and I think that he really was sensitized on that issue. And I think he was really uncomfortable with the tobacco industry and I think that one of Scruggs's key aces in the hole here is his relationship with Trent. Q. Is that why Scruggs turned up in Trent Lott's suite at the 96 Republican Convention? Morris: Okay. Well, the sisters are very close, Trent's wife and Dick's wife are very close and Dick's wife is very involved in this and feels very passionately about it. Q. During this period of your being the Prime Minister-- Morris: That's your phrase not mine. Q. Well, that's Dick Scruggs's phrase. Morris: Okay. Q. The go-between between Lott and [Clinton], right? Morris: Yeah. Q. What stands out as sort of your feeling that these guys really were together actually on this issue? Morris: Well, most of the time I--I didn't really deal with Trent on tobacco very much until April or May of 96 when Scruggs told me that the tobacco companies were suing for peace. That they had reached out to him and said they were interested in settling these lawsuits. And at that time it seemed that it was very possible for that to happen in 1996. And uh, as I mentioned, Trent had kind of designated some people to help put this together, and those were the negotiations that were going on. So I kept the President closely informed of what Scruggs was doing and Scruggs kept Trent closely informed of what he was doing. And uh, I kept the President aware of the fact and constantly focusing on the fact that Trent was probably moving with Scruggs and that therefore he probably could count on helping Congress and getting this thing done. It was the willingness of Lott and the Republicans to be part of the process uh, that gave it sense of political reality to it. As opposed to pie in the sky. Q. Did the President ever say, "I want to settle because I want to show them we've accomplished this."? Or, was he reluctant to settle and say, "Listen. We wounded em, we better kill em."? Morris: The President was thrilled at the idea that this could be settled. He was absolutely euphoric about it. Q. Did he jump out of his seat or what? Morris: He said, "You mean they really could do this? I mean we really could bring this about?" Just, he was just excited about it. Uh, and constantly, whenever I would brief him on the talks and stuff he would say, "That's great. Great. Let's just keep going. Keep going, that's terrific." Gore was apprehensive about it. Gore is much more-- read the fine print and pay attention to the details. And Gore had a very cynical view of the tobacco industry, and felt that they couldn't possibly mean anything in good faith, and that if they were going to give you a concession then there was something that they had in the back of their mind that you didn't know about. They were smarter than you were. And that they had some-- Q. Did he say that? Morris: Yeah, in effect. And that they had some marketing gimmick that they would pull out of the hat at the last minute and would screw it all up. And he told me early on that he would look to three people to give him advice on this. Uh, Kessler, Waxman and, Myers from the smoking coalition, the anti-smoking coalition. And, um, I relayed that back to Scruggs and that's the time when Scruggs reached out to Myers from the Coalition Against Smoking to get him into these talks and these negotiations because he would be so influential with Gore. Um, so the state of play really in the White House in the April, May, June, July, August of 1996 period was eager anticipation of the possibility of a tobacco deal by the President and tremendous concern and caution on the part of the Vice President. Q. And then the trial balloon, or the week in September destroyed the whole process? Morris: Derailed it for this time. There was no longer a chance of getting it through before the election. Q. Okay. And then we have from Scruggs and from Moore the history of the deal progressing. You know they backed away and then--what do you think brought the tobacco industry back to the table. Back to, you know--? Morris: Well, the macro of any negotiation is that the only time you can cut a deal is when both sides are hurting. If either side is, is well and feeling happy, you can't get a deal. Then they go for victory. You need--if they're willing to settle for things the other side can live with, it's because they're hurting a little bit. And the tobacco companies at the beginning of this process weren't hurting at all. They were winning everything, that they encountered. Then they began to see their vulnerability with these Medicaid lawsuits, when state after state after state followed Mississippi's model and filed these lawsuits, uh they, the potential liability piled up and they were really scared. Uh, frankly, if they lose two or three of these lawsuits they're going to go broke, and this is a very serious issue for them. Q. Scruggs and Moore, once they announced their deal in June of 97, uh, in their words, "descended into the swamp of Washington." They say they learned a lot of lessons. They really did not realize that it was a town where people told you one thing in private and then something else in public. Morris: Right. Q. Did they talk to you about that? Morris: Yes. I think that Scruggs and Moore were so used to fighting the tobacco companies that they were unused to fighting a two-front war, with the tobacco companies in front of them and the public health companies in the rear. Because the public health community basically said, "Thanks for the gains, now get lost. We want to kill these guys. We don't want to make a deal with them." And whereas the President strongly believed that this should be limited to stopping teen smoking, the public health community wants to wipe out cigarette companies entirely and make everyone that smokes not have cigarettes anymore. I mean that, that's their goal and it's laudable, but impractical. So, um, Scruggs and Moore I don't think were prepared for the splash on the Left over this issue, and I think they were shocked by it. And then, I think they expected Clinton to stand up and deal and tame the Left and get a deal going. But I think Clinton basically took the position of, "Why should I do this when the courts are going to do it? The courts are probably going to rule against the FDA. If they do then that'll give me the ammunition to put a deal together." But then I think Clinton also realized because he's a marvelous student of the practical, that if the courts ruled in favor of the public health groups and against the cigarette industry that no force on earth was going to constrain them. Then there was just going to be rout, and frankly I don't think Clinton weeps over tobacco companies. I don't think he cares much if those companies die. Uh, he's not going to be too grieved about that and at that point, you know, the Huns sack Rome. And then who knows where it goes? Uh, but I think that his feeling was that he would only attempt to impose a deal when there was a reason to do it, which is that it was the only way he could get FDA jurisdiction. Q. One last question. You placed this issue, this whole thing on a macro level that is beyond belief in terms of what the politics can accomplish and all of this came out of a bunch of guys in Mississippi in Pascagoula? Morris: When the history of the 20th century is written, there are going to be some pretty obscure people who are entitled to sainthood. And they're not going to be well-known. Nobody is going to know their names, and um, I don't know if they'll go on to do anything else in their lives. I don't know what their futures hold. But Scruggs and Moore have earned their place in heaven. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/
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Bennett LeBow is the CEO of the Brooke Group which owns Liggett Tobacco, the smallest of the six major tobacco companies. Considered a relative newcomer to the industry and a Wall Street operator, LeBow stunned his counterparts at Philip Morris, Brown & Williamson, RJR Nabisco, Loews and Lorillard when he broke ranks and announced he would settle the Medicaid suits brought by forty state attorneys general. In this February 1998 FRONTLINE interview, LeBow also revealed that he was cooperating with the Justice Department in its criminal investigation of the tobacco industry. Q: What was the tobacco industry's legal strategy in essence? Lebow: Then it was fight every lawsuit. Wear them down. Spend all the money in the world because the cigarette companies had all the money in the world to spend. Just wear the other side down, and they'll go away. And they were going away. The strategy seemed to have been working. Q: When did you begin to question that strategy? LeBow: Well, honestly, for about eight, nine years, I just followed the strategy. We had a group of lawyers, about six or seven outside attorneys that just did, year after year, this tobacco litigation. Then the major companies led the way, so to speak. And back in 1995, about three years ago, a couple of strange things happened. This group of outside attorneys that we had were doing most of the tobacco litigation for Liggett and their law firm was dissolving for other reasons. And they came to me, and they said we want to go to another major law firm in New York. I said, your law firm is dissolving, I know this other smaller law firm that specializes in product liability...they're experts in it, why don't you go to that law firm. I'll put you there, and we'll use them because they're experts in this. And I don't know this other law firm. They called me up the next day. They said, "Mr. LeBow, you let us go to this big law firm, Philip Morris will pay all of your legal fees." I said, "What? They want to pay my legal fees. My competitor wants to pay my legal fees." I know we're in the joint defense thing, but it didn't sound right. So I started to smell something wrong there. This is now, I think we're talking about September of '95. I said, "Go ahead and go there, because I'm busy with some other things. Go there. They want to pay my legal fees. I won't right now look a gift horse in the mouth. We'll take the money." But I really started to smell something. Q: In effect these were bargain attorneys? Lebow: Yeah, well, free. Q: Free lawyers. Free. . .? Lebow: Free lawyers. I mean, you know, how can I turn it down. It really got my. . . the bells going off. Q: What kind of money are we talking about in terms of your legal fees? Lebow: It was running about eight million dollars a year at the time. Q: So, Philip Morris is willing to give you a legal defense fund at eight million dollars a year, no questions asked. Lebow: Right. Providing my lawyers go to one of the firms they like, not my firm. Q: And so then, you get into the attempt to leverage. Lebow: And so then, I get involved with some other share holders and am attempting to. . . recommending to RJR that they spin off Nabisco. They take their three businesses and separate it from the tobacco business. Q: You own Liggett, your holding group and you then want to try and take over a larger company, RJR, which also obviously has a big tobacco component. Lebow: And make money in stock that we've bought in RJR. And the obvious way was to separate the two businesses, the tobacco business and the food business. The food business in this case being Nabisco. So, myself and other shareholders, we started an action doing that, and we won. All the shareholders voted for this to be done. Q: Now, why did you want to split them up? Lebow: So, the share values would go up. Q: And what was your sense of the Medicaid suits? Lebow: Well, let me finish. They came out and said, "Mr. LeBow, we can't split these two companies up because there is too much litigation." I said, "What litigation?" I've been told for eight, nine years that there's no litigation. There's a couple lawsuits, you know, Medicaid and a few other individuals. There was some class actions then, which everyone has said, "No problem. We win everything. There's no issue." Now, I've got two things happening. I have Philip Morris paying my legal fees. I've got RJR saying they can't do this spin off or split up because of all the litigation possibility. I really got suspicious. So, then I authorized the new law firm. We're now talking three months after Philip Morris' overtures to the other side. I really want to find out what's going on now. Q: Talk to the other side in what? Lebow: Meaning the plaintiffs, meaning the Attorneys Generals, meaning the Castano case class action lawyer. Q: So, both the class action lawyers and the Attorney Generals like Mike Moore. You authorized the new lawyers, not part of this big firm. Lebow: Not part of those guys. In secret. Q: In secret, to talk to the plaintiffs. Unheard of before. Lebow: Never been done before. No tobacco attorney ever talked to any of these other attorneys in thirty years. So, the first time in secret talking to them in late December, '95, they had some secret meetings to explore what's going on. Because I want to find out what's going on. And the easy way to find out is to talk to the other side. Instead of trying to read papers, let's hear the other guy's view point. The lawsuit, which I didn't quite understand at the time. There are these class action lawsuits, and the big issue is nicotine. Nicotine, never disclosed by the tobacco companies that they really believed that nicotine's addictive. And also in the back of my mind, remembered everybody getting up in Congress and swearing, "No, nicotine is not addictive. We don't believe it is. Etcetera, etcetera." Q: Tell me about when you first talked to the other side. LeBow: But then in '95 when all these other things are happening, I'm starting to think something's wrong here. See after meeting with these AG's, we had to have two months of secret meetings not telling any of the attorneys, not telling anyone. The only person I told was the new president of Liggett at the time, and myself, and the new attorneys. We then negotiated...the settlement in the March of '96. Q: This is called Liggett One?. Lebow: Liggett One, with five Attorneys General and the Costano class action suit attorney. Q: Did you notify the people who were paying your legal fees or any of their friends, or RJR that you're about to do this? Lebow: No. Q: You didn't tell them that after thirty or forty years of a united front, that you were about to defect? Lebow: Absolutely not. They all read about it in The Wall Street Journal. I didn't tell anyone because I honestly, you know, I can't tell my attorneys, they're being paid by the other tobacco companies. So, I can't. . . I don't say, I don't trust them, but it wasn't right. The only attorneys who knew worked with a new law firm. Q: You didn't trust your own attorneys? Lebow: Not in this place. Now, needless to say, when that came out, they came and fired me, my attorneys. Q: Wait, they fired you? Lebow: They fired me. Q: Because? Lebow: Because I didn't confer with them in this negotiation, I suspect. You'll have to ask them why they fired me. It's pretty obvious. So, in this Liggett One, in March of '96, everybody goes crazy. Wall Street says, "What did you do? This is insane." Etcetera, etcetera. And the truth of all this, I didn't believe the strategy these tobacco companies are following. I mean none of the strategy made sense. Intellectually, I just didn't believe it. You have to win every lawsuit. There's nothing here. We're never going to lose. And also recognize that Liggett is the smallest of all the tobacco companies. From a financial point of view, I also said to myself, we can't afford to lose even one lawsuit, one Medicaid case. We go neatly bankrupt. So, from a financial point of view, at this time, I figured it was the right thing to do, to make a settlement. Why stay in court the rest of your life? The other companies have this scorched earth policy that we're going to spend, and spend, and spend, and spend, and spend, and win and win and win. And I didn't want to become a satellite of Philip Morris with them paying my legal fees, or a subsidiary of them. When we did this, everybody went berserk. Q: Didn't you ever doubt what you were doing? Lebow: No, I never did. Not for once. I knew it was the right thing to do. I really did have this sense, call it a gut feel, call it what you want, it was the right thing to do. Talking on a personal level, I also see a tobacco company standing up and saying, "Well, cigarettes don't cause any harmful effects." What kind of a statement is that? Cigarettes are not addictive... what kind of a statement is that? How can they keep doing this? Then, let me tell you what then happened. I got fired by my old law firm. I told my new lawyers, let's get these documents everybody is talking about. I want to see these documents. We had not looked at any of these documents, because I didn't want to confer with my previous attorneys at the time. My new lawyers then took the documents away from the old lawyers, and spent about four or five months studying. And by the end of '96, the middle of '96, they came to me and said, Ben, there's some serious things in these documents. There's some issues of crime and fraud and all kinds of things, and it's well known that smoking is addictive, and all these types of things in these documents. I said, "That's it. I don't want to talk about it anymore. Let's get in touch with all the Attorneys General, all the attorneys involved in this thing, and try to negotiate a new settlement for us." Which we did. Q: You mean a new broader settlement? Lebow: A new, broader settlement. And by this time, more Attorneys General had filed lawsuits. Q: And by then there were 23 states. Lebow: Originally there were only four or five. Now more had come in, and it had broadened the whole situation. Then, we took about four to six months negotiating. We now come to March of '97 when we announced a new, broader settlementt with 21 states. Now we're up to 26 states that have settled with us. Q: And you've agreed at this point, not just on a financial deal, but also to do what? Lebow: To admit to everything, admit to smoking being addictive, admit to all the health hazards of smoking, to turn over all of our documents, to waive all of our attorney-client privilege. Turn all of our documents over which we did. Immediately, that very day, RJR ran to a North Carolina court to stop me. . . to try to stop us from turning over documents. And we had turned them over to the courts in escrow for the judges to decide whether there is anything in these documents that represents crime or fraud and whether attorney client privilege should be waived, etcetera, etcetera. So, we did all this. And lo and behold, two weeks later, all the attorneys, all the other companies show up at the door of the Attorneys General to negotiate a broader, more comprehensive settlement for themselves. Q: Let me take you back, again. You indicated then--I'm talking about Liggett One -- that you were not doing this out of altruism. You were doing this to help you take over RJR. Lebow: RJR was saying they couldn't do a spin off, they couldn't take out Nabisco and so forth, because of all of these lawsuits. One obvious motive I had was, okay, let's settle the lawsuits and solve that problem for the shareholders. That's what got me started looking into it. To really find out what's going on here, what the problems are. But the more I look. . . And then after the lawyers fired me, and then we got the documents, I mean it was obvious we were doing the right thing. And then the whole thing changed in that regard. Q: What do you mean? Lebow: All right, there were two elements to it. First of all, admittedly, the first time we started looking at it, I had economic motivations going into this. And one economic motivation was to get a better deal for Liggett, a better economic deal. Now, in theory I had the idea that if Liggett got a better economic deal...if the other people had to pay more and Liggett had paid less, we'd have a competitive advantage and be able to survive. And at this point, bear in mind that Liggett is going down. Q: What was happening to your stock? Lebow: Well, our stock and our sales are going down. And especially, after I did something like this in Liggett One and Liggett Two, the other companies are coming after us, I mean competitively. So, we had to have some sort of economic life preserver to survive, to survive all this onslaught. The other issue they're talking about is the RJR issue. At the time, back in '95, '96, we were involved in this proxy fight, and RJR was saying they can't do the spin off because of litigation. So, the most obvious thing for a business man to do, okay, is settle the litigation. There's no more problem, and we can do this spin off and everybody makes money. So, I was sort of flabbergasted that when we did this, all the shareholders are, "What are you doing?" "This is crazy" But we have the right to spin her off. And as it turns out, a lot of the shareholders also hold Philip Morris stock, own Philip Morris and RJR. And they saw this as possibly hurting Philip Morris more than it would help RJR. Q: Who are these shareholders? Lebow: Institutions, major institutions. Q: Like Fidelity Magellan. Lebow: Every major institution in the United States you can think of, you know, owns stock in both companies. Q: Like public employee funds. Lebow: Yeah, state funds, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera. Q: So, these are the big heavy hitters in the marketplace? Lebow: Right. Q: What I've been told by the negotiators, Scruggs, Moore, and others, is that when they brought up the Liggett deals, RJR said, "That's a deal breaker." We are not giving -- they wouldn't mention your name -- we are not giving them anything. And Philip Morris' lawyers' eyes just rolled up to the ceiling. Lebow: Well, it's not up to them, it's up to the President and the Congress to do what's right here. It's not up to the tobacco industry. I mean, they don't make the laws in this country. Yeah, I've heard they've threatened to walk away from any settlement, tobacco settlement, that Liggett got, the contracts we have. Nothing special. We're not asking for anything special...all we're asking for is that our contracts be honored. The deals we negotiated. Q: They're paying hundreds of millions of dollars. Lebow: They're not paying a penny. They're paying nothing. Let's get it straight. They're raising their prices to cover it. The poor addicted smoker and the U.S. taxpayer is paying. So, don't yell at me that we're only paying a couple of million dollars out of our pocket, I don't see them paying a penny yet. Q: They're not paying up front out of their own cash in Mississippi and Florida? Lebow: They're raising the prices to get the money back. Q: And they're already raising the prices. Lebow: They already did. They did it last year. they've already done it. . .with the new settlement. Q: I mean, I was amazed that things have changed so fast. Lebow: Yeah, I was too. I knew it would change. I felt it would change. I thought it would take a little bit longer. But they had the trials coming up, that was the impetus. The Mississippi trials, and the Florida trials coming up. And they should have really done it six months earlier. Because it turned out they didn't have time. Q: What do you mean? Lebow: Well, they really should have settled, I think, a year earlier than they did. Started the negotiations a year earlier, because they're under the gun with the trials, the Mississippi trials and the Florida trials. They had to go settle with really big numbers, you know, a lot different than it probably would have been a year earlier. And they knew the schedule, they knew these trial schedules. These are all public knowledge. So my opinion is, they should have started the negotiations to settle these things a year earlier. And they could have had time to get it through Congress. Q: Your perspective was, you guys might lose in court. LeBow: I started to understand. I never understood before, but I do now. Yeah, there are warning labels on the cigarettes, have been for many years, since 1967 or so. But there was a never warning label that smoking is addictive. That one warning label was not there. You know, when I really focused on it a few years ago, when I heard the Medicaid cases from the Attorneys General, they had a good case...maybe. But why fight? Why not try and work out a reasonable settlement and do the right thing. Q: But you're a businessman. You're not going to pay somebody a lot of money or make such a settlement that will cause all this havoc, unless you were making a bet that they could win. Lebow: Obviously I was making that bet, yes. Absolutely. I believe they had a strong case. And I believe sooner or later, they're going to win. And I wanted to settle quickly. Obviously the first person is going to get a better deal. Q: But once you admit that it does all these things, aren't you admitting that you're selling consumers something that could very well kill them? Lebow: Well, A, it's legal. But, B, they're fully informed. Consumers now have full information about everything. All of our documents are released. We've waived our attorney client privilege, etcetera, etcetera. I mean, that's the way it is, that's the way it's going to be going forward. And not sold to children, that's the important thing. And by the way, another thing we've said publicly which is important. We've said this publicly, and I'll say it again now, that in 25 to 30 years, we sure will be out of business. Because by definition, if you're really, really not going to sell to children, they're not going to have any customers in 25 or 30 years. So, I'd like to hear the other companies make that statement that they intend to be out of business in 25, 30, whatever, a generation. If they're really, really not selling to children, we're all going to be out of business. Q: You're known as a hard dollars and cents guy. Lebow: Liggett could not afford to lose one Medicaid case. Because we can't even afford to post a bond to appeal it. Even though we thought we were right, we had economic motivations in that regard to make a deal, no question about it. But after seeing the documents and understanding these things, I couldn?t just from a moral point of view couldn't go forward and keep saying that smoking is not addictive. Q: What did your attorneys tell you? Lebow: My attorneys told me that these documents became serious evidence, a crime, fraud, obstruction of justice, etcetera, etcetera, and we turned these documents over to the various courts. And so far, three courts have found the same thing. So it's obviously true. I mean a court in Florida, a court in Minnesota, and even another court I believe, came out with the same type of informations saying these documents have serious problems in them. Q: And have you turned these documents over to the Department of Justice criminal investigation? Lebow: Yes. Q: They've come here and gotten copies?. Lebow: Yes. They got them from either our attorneys or from the courts we turned them over to. There's no issue there. Q: Have they come here and questioned people? Lebow: Not to my knowledge. Not that I know have. Q: No one from Liggett, as far as you know, has been subpoenaed or brought to Washington to testify? Lebow: I don't know if I can answer that question because I'm not sure of the legalities. So, I'd rather not answer that. I'm sure some of the people have testified. Q: So, this could get serious. I mean beyond money, even if you're willing to reform. Lebow: Well, it's well known that the Justice Department is investigating, has some grand jury investigations going. That's well known. There was, one plea on the nicotine plant issue last week. So, I suspect there's other things going on. We'll see what the Justice Department does. Q: But in the background of all of these discussions about public health and how much in damages and how to change marketing, there still looms this cloud of potential criminal charges. Lebow: That's correct. Q: Do you think that's motivating anybody in the settlement? Lebow: My understanding is during their settlement negotiations, they do have criminal attorneys present. They're trying to get some criminal immunity without totally taking it off the table. So, I'm sure that's part of the motivations the companies have. We have no concerns over it at Liggett. I mean, I have no personal concerns. And we're cooperating completely with the Justice Department. Q: So, when you say, you're in a sense turning over evidence to the Attorney General, you're also turning over evidence to the Attorney General of the United States. Lebow: Oh, yes, absolutely. Q: What about the so-called stealth amendment -- the fifty billion dollar tax deduction if they had to make these settlement payments. Lebow: Right. Instead of 368 billion, it would be 50 billion. Everybody in Washington just went crazy over that. And it was 96 to 4 in the Senate. The vote was completely lopsided. You don't do those things in secret like that. You know, it just shows. . . Q: It was a stealth amendment. Lebow: It was a stealth amendment. Q: They showed their power. Lebow: They tried to show their power, and I think lost a lot of power because of it. I think Congress and the White House -- they've wakened to the fact that this is not the way things should be done. Things should be done correctly, and I believe that Congress and the White House will do the correct thing going forward. Q: Let me change the subject on you a little bit, just because we're focusing to a certain extent on the attorneys general and what happened. When you first met Dick Scruggs and Mike Moore, what did you make of them? Lebow: I thought they were really crusaders. Q: Moore was a crusader? Lebow: Absolute crusader. He was crusading for something he believed in. And I was very impressed by his record. And it turns out he was a hell of a crusader...General Moore. It turns out he was right all along. And I was impressed. Q: Not your average politician? Lebow: No, not your average politician. Q: Why not? Lebow: He had a focus. He and Dickey Scruggs wanted to accomplish something, and they went for it, you know, all the way. And they did it, and they deserve all the credit that they get. Q: In a nutshell, what was the importance of these suits by the attorneys general in your mind? Lebow: I think they're very important, and I think it's obviously been proven true. They led the way. It's gotten people really started thinking. And also they were major in numbers. I mean the amount of money that they were demanding, asking for was quite large. Florida, for example, passed a special statute which took away a lot of tobacco's traditional defenses. So, I think they were very, very important in the scheme of things. Q: They, if you will, check-mated the industry. Lebow: Yeah, as you saw, all the class actions got thrown out. Most of them got thrown out. So, it's strictly the large lawsuits, the attorneys general lawsuits, that worry the industry. The industry is never afraid of one individual lawsuit. They could always pay, you know, a million dollars here or a half million dollars there, wherever it may be. But the attorney general lawsuits also included RICO charges and punitive damage potential, which really got the industry thinking. Q: Is it a lesson for other corporations, for other industries? Lebow: Yeah, I think it should be a lesson. I think all these lawsuits and all this litigation should be a lesson that people should do the right thing and not withhold information. Not withhold over years and years, all these types of things. You sit back and you look at it, it's kind of ridiculous. We all know cigarettes cause problems. We all know it's addictive. So, why don't we disclose all this stuff. Why were all these secret things being done. I mean just on an individual basis, sitting back and looking at this, I don't understand why they did it. Q: I don't think I've ever talked to a businessman before who says that he hopes that his business will go away. Lebow: Well, I hope it goes away. I really, truly hope it goes away. I hope I'm around to see it go away even, at my age. But I really hope it goes away. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/
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Steven F. Goldstone is the Chief Executive Officer of RJ Reynolds, the second largest cigarette maker in the United States. Goldstone joined RJ Reynolds in 1995 after having been a corporate attorney in New York for 25 years. Q. You’ve been quoted in newspapers as saying that under your stewardship, you intend to make Reynolds uh–to instill a new sense of corporate culture in Reynolds. Do you recall making that statement? A. Actually [talk over each other]. Q. Well, is it true? A. Uh, Mr. Miley, I think that managers today at Reynolds understand that, that company has to accept responsibility uh and conduct itself in a responsible manner and to that extent, I’m satisfied that they are doing that today. Q. Mr. Cosco, do you agree that in the past Reynolds managers, not under your helm, have made mistakes that have impacted adversely on public health? A. I can’t say that, Mr. Miley. The only thing I–and I know you were going to go through a lot of this, but in fairness to me, really, I’ve been in this company a year and a half. I know there are lawsuits surrounding the conduct of this company. I talked to my lawyers about it a lot. I understanding there are ranging debates in these cases, including this one you have in Florida, but I, I don’t have judgments to make. I’m not interested in the past. That’s something for you and the judges and the juries to figure out. For me, it’s going forward in the future and how we conduct ourselves in the future. Q. Well, if you’re going to conduct yourself differently in the future than obviously you’re going to make some changes, correct? A. What is said to you is that we’re going to conduct ourselves responsibly. I’d like to think our company conducted itself responsibly in all circumstances in the past, but that is what the subject of this litigation in Florida’s all about. Q. As the calls came [unintelligible]? A. Well, it’s a, it’s a complicated question for me, uh, and I hope you’ll give me a second. Q. You take all the time you want, sir. A. Answer that one for you, because um, for myself, and this is just my own personal opinion. I have been in this world for 51 years. I’m not a scientist, but I, I do believe that uh today that uh cigarette smoking play plays a role in causing lung cancer. Um and uh I’m in the job I’m in and I believe that uh, uh the State of Florida, the government of the State of Florida, I think most people on your side of the table, I believe the President of the United States and I believe everyone in Congress and I believe most Americans believe that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer. And all of those people, Florida, the Governor, the President, the Congress, has decided against Prohibition. They’ve decided that American adults, with free information and with good information, ought to be able to make their own choice. Politically, I personally believe in that. I believe in that very much. I think it’s one of the most important principles that we have in this country, but uh, if Mr. Schindler uh–if it became a revelation for him and he decided he shouldn’t uh participate in the business anymore, I could understand completely. But I, I, for me, today, sitting here, if a scientist could connect the scientific gaps, fill in the scientific gaps, that would not be a revelation to me uh that uh cigarette smoking somehow was found to cause cancer. Um, that’s not a shock to me. I don’t think it’s a shock to almost any American today. So, that’s where I am on that. I will tell you this. Um, I was watching on CNN this morning and saw some–one of the universities, uh, one of the scientists thought that they had discovered what it was, the mechanism [unintelligible] cause from smoking to lung cancer. And Lord knows, I hope they do and if they do, um, these tobacco companies damn well better work like lunatics to figure out how to improve their products. I could be, it would great for all Americans to understand cancer more and I think it would be great for all Americans to understand cancer more and I think it would be important for this industry to do that. And the other thing, Mr. Motley on that, is this time, this industry will work hand in hand with the government and will work uh cooperatively on terms of medical research, but um denying basis uh truths, medical truths, is not what the industry will do, at least not what R.J. Reynolds tobacco company will do. Q. I take it, sir, then you do accept that cigarette smoking is a cause of disease in humans?” Goldstone: “I will tell you because I’m not a scientist, and I respect the views of our scientist in our company who very compellingly explained to me why there are gaps in scientific knowledge. But I’ve only been in this company a couple of years. I was a smoker myself at one time, and I have always believed– rightly or wrongly, I have always believed that smoking plays a role in causing lung cancer. What that role is, I have no idea, but I do believe that.” Motley: “So your answer to my question is yes?” Goldstone: “Yes, sir.” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/
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Preston Tisch is the Co-chairman of Loews Corporation, a company that acquired Lorillard Tobacco in 1960. Tisch also currently owns fifty percent of the New York Giants. He and his brother Laurence Alan Tisch have been involved in a number of corporate takeovers including the acquisition of CBS, which they sold to Westinghouse Electric Corporation in 1995. State of Florida v. American Tobacco et al. August 15, 1996 Motley: “Do you believe, sir, that a corporation that makes a product has a moral responsibility to investigate the properties of that property–of that-” Mr. Boffa: (Defense Attorney): “Object to the form of the question.” Tisch: “I believe it is a question that I can’t answer. I’m not capable of answering.” Motley: “You are not capable of answering that… whether a corporation that makes 40 billion cigarettes a year has a moral responsibility to find out whether that product causes harm to their customers?” Mr. Boffa: “Object to the form of the question.” Tisch: “I never thought about it.” Motley: “You never thought about it. Motley: “Now, this letter from the American Cancer Society was addressed to Congressman Kornegay. It is in reference to a press release of January the 3rd. And then about an advertisement that was placed. If you would look, sir, at the letter, Number 10, the first paragraph, where they put in quotes, the “commitments to honest scientific research to help resolve the controversy about smoking and health.” And if you look at the ad, that uses words such as “commitments,” “honest,” “scientific research,” “controversy,” “smoking and health.”Do you see what I am talking about, sir?” Tisch: “Yes, sir.” Motley: “Let’s look at the American — by the way, did you ever meet Mr. Lewis?” Tisch: “No, I did not.” Motley: “You are familiar with the American Cancer Society?” Tisch: “Yes, I am.” Motley: “Have you ever been a participant in its activities –” Tisch: “No.” Motley: “–over your career? Mr. Lewis on behalf of the board of directors of the American Cancer Society, says at paragraph 1, `The controversy about smoking and health continues, largely, because of the energy, time and money spent by the tobacco industry in keeping this controversy alive. Advertisements of the sort you enclose seem to me to have as their major point the reassurance to cigarette smokers that you express in your headline: The question about smoking and health is still a question.’Is that, in fact, the headline of the ad?” Tisch: “Yes, it is.” Motley: “That the question about smoking and health is still a question.In 1971, sir, do you, when you joined the board of directors, do you recall whether the subject about the question about smoking and health is still a question was ever aired, a-i-r-e-d?” Tisch: “I don’t recall, sir.” Motley: “Then he goes down in the paragraph beginning, “Population studies”, number 2, then there is a paragraph that says, “Population studies.” Do you see that, on that –” Tisch: “Yes, I do.” Motley: “Okay. Then he says, “The evidence” — the second sentence — “The evidence of the threat to health has been accepted here and abroad by every medical, scientific, and public health body that has examined the problem and expressed an opinion. The most recent such statement came from London’s prestigious Royal College of Physicians which said ‘Cigarette smoking is now as important a cause of death as were the great epidemic diseases such as typhoid, cholera, and tuberculosis,’ and asked the government to end ‘the present Holocaust- a reasonable word to describe the annual death toll (in Great Britain) of some 27,500 men and women aged 25 to 64 from the burning of tobacco.’ Another in the series of brilliant reports by the United States Public Health Service and the Surgeon General will soon be issued reaffirming the evidence that smoking is a major cause of lung cancer and contributes to heart disease, emphysema and other conditions, and stressing the grave dangers to women in smoking cigarettes.” Now, in regard to that one paragraph, sir, did anyone at Lorillard communicate to you, sir, as the president of Loews at the time, that such a statement was being made, and such information was being imparted, whether it is true or not? Was this the kind of information given to you from ’71 to ’76 while you sat on the board of the Tobacco Institute and the Council for Tobacco Research?” Tisch: “I don’t recall. I don’t believe so.” Motley: “There are some pretty strong words in there, aren’t there? Tisch: “That’s correct.” Motley: “Epidemic is a strong word, isn’t?” Tisch: “Yes, it is.” Motley: “Holocaust is a terrible word, isn’t it?” Tisch: “That is correct.” Motley: “Would you like to have known that people were– AmericanCancer Society is known to you to be a responsible organization, isn’t it?” Tisch: “I assume so. Yes.” Motley: “And would you not liked to have known that someone was using these kind of words to describe the industry that you had just joined?” Mr. Boffa: “Object to the form of the question.” Tisch: “The American Cancer Society wrote this letter, and that’s their opinion and, fine, they wrote it.” Motley: “Well, but it says here that it is not just the American Cancer Society. They are saying the Royal College of Physicians of Great Britain said that — likened it to an epidemic and Holocaust. My point is, would you just like to have known so you could have considered it in making policy decisions?” Mr. Boffa: “Object to the form of the question.” Motley: “Those strong words? Those strong accusations?” Tisch: “I would like to know whatever I can.” Motley: “Yes, sir. Thank you. Now, on page 2 down at the bottom, the last sentence, “The continued promotion and advertising of cigarettes contributes to a grave health program, it also creates a moral problem for your industry.” “You say, I know of no single individual among the hundreds of thousands of tobacco farmers, manufacturing and distribution employees and executives and retailers who believes he is profiting from poison instead of pleasure.” Mr. Lewis writes on behalf of the board of directors of the American Cancer Society, “Belief that a gun is not loaded, when experts reassure you that it is, is hardly an excuse when the gun goes off and someone is wounded or killed.” That’s, again, a strong statement, is it not?” Tisch: “By Mr. Lewis, yes.” Motley: “Yes, it is. And sir, from your public service — I know you have a commitment to the public and the public health, don’t you?” Tisch: “The public–” Motley: “Personally, do you?” Tisch: “The public service, yes.” Motley: “Including public health?” Mr. Boffa (Defense Attorney): “Object to the form of the question.” Tisch: “Anything in public service.” Motley: “And public health?” Boffa: “Object to the form of the question.” Tisch: “If that’s a part of public service.” Motley: “And you feel a moral responsibility for what your company does, do you not?” Tisch: “Yes, I do.” Motley: “Don’t you think, sir, that someone should have brought these things to your attention so you could have made a moral judgment, if not a business one, about what to do about making billions of cigarettes a year?” Boffa: “Object to the form of the question.” Tisch: “They may have. I can’t recall if they did or not.” Motley: “If they did, it didn’t impact on you? You don’t remember?” Tisch: “I don’t remember, sir.” Motley: “Well, can you tell me, sir, have you– have there been discussions at Loews at any time about cigarette smoking and lung cancer?” Mr. Boffa (Defense Attorney): “Object to the form of the question.” Tisch: “Not that I recall.” Motley: “Never been any discussions?” Tisch: “Not that I recall.” Motley: “Have you seen documents, sir, where questions and answers were prepared for management in the event stockholders posed questions about smoking and health issues?” Tisch: “No, I don’t recall.” Motley: “And you don’t recall since 1969, over 27 years, there has never been a word mentioned at the Loews board about tobacco and health?” Boffa: “Object to the form of the question.” Tisch: “I don’t recall.” Motley: “You don’t recall that a single word has ever been said at a board meeting of Loews about tobacco and health?” Boffa: “Object to the form of the question.” Tisch: “I don’t… I don’t recall.” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/
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Laurence Tisch is the co-chairman of Loews Corporation, a company that acquired Lorillard Tobacco in 1960. Tisch and his brother Preston have been involved in a number of corporate takeovers including the acquisition of CBS, which they sold to Westinghouse Electric Corporation in 1995. Q. Well, have you inquired at any board meetings of Loew’s Corporation of any– of Dr. Spears or anybody else in Lorillard what the position of Lorillard is today on the issue of whether smoking causes lung cancer [unintelligible]? A. No. Q. Have you inquired as to what the position of Lorillard is at any time in the 1990s about whether cigarette causing lung cancer? A. No. Q. Have you inquired any time in the 1990s at to whether or not nicotine is an addictive substance? A. Of whom? Q. Anybody in Lorillard. [unintelligible], Dr. Spears, [unintelligible] judge, anybody? A. No. Q. Has the Loew’s board, to you knowledge, every had an agenda item or discussed smoking and health issues, just in general, at any time? Has it ever been an agenda item? A. Not an agenda item. The issue has come up in discussions, various discussions of Lorillard in lawsuits and things of that type. Q. Have you ever asked what position is Lorillard taking in lawsuits with respect to whether cigarette smoking causes lung cancer? A. I haven’t asked that question. Q. Have you ever heard any position being articulated, whether you asked the question or not, as to the position Lorillard is taking in lawsuits about whether smoking causes lung disease? A. No. I will state for the record, that although it is in my area, I think the representation that you previously made as to what the company’s supposed position is, is flatly… http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/
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Geoffrey Bible: Australian-born Geoffrey Bible became the Chief Executive Officer of Philip Morris, the world’s largest tobacco company, in November 1997. Bible is a veteran of Philip Morris, where he had worked as an accountant for nearly three decades. Florida v. American Tobacco Co. August 21, 1997 Ron Motley: “What percentage of the under 18 age cigarette market does Philip Morris enjoy?” Bible: “I have no idea.” Motley: “Have you ever asked?” Bible: “No, I’ve never asked.” Motley: “Do you know that it’s over 50 percent?” Bible: “No, I don’t. But I think it would be fair to say that if there are young people who smoke, since Philip Morris has about 50 percent of the market, that probably we have 50 percent of the cigarettes that young people smoke.” Motley: “Well, in fact, do you know that you have over two-thirds of the youth market?” Bible: “No, I don’t, and I don’t know how anybody could establish that.” Motley: “Have you asked anyone to tell you what percent of the youth market that Philip Morris has?” Bible: “No, I never have.” Motley: “Are you aware that in 1976 Philip Morris executives issued a report called `Why People Start to Smoke’ and then discuss children from the age of ten to the age of 18 and why they start smoking?” Bible: “No, I’m not aware of that. It doesn’t sound sinister to me.” Q. Mr. Bible, would you state your current position with Philip Morris? A. Yes, I’m Chief Executive Office and Chairman of the Board of Philip Morris Companies. Q. In common parlance, that means you’re the #1 guy? A. That would be right. Q. Sir, do you remember making a speech on Thurs–on Wednesday, April 24, 1996 to approximately 2,000 Philip Morris employees? A. Not specifically, no. Q. Do you recall a board meeting of uh, of uh, excuse me, a shareholder’s meeting that was to be held on–in April 1996 in Richmond, VA? A. Yes, that’s when we had our annual stockholders, meeting, uh-huh. Q. Don’t you remember, sir, gathering about 2,000 employees of Philip Morris in Richmond, VA…? A. Right. Q. And making a speech? A. That rings a bell now, yes. Q. And do you recall there was a newspaper article about that speech? A. I don’t specifically recall it, but I guess there would have been, yeah. Q. Yes and do you recall that you compared Philip Morris and the cigarette manufacturers as the Allies in World War II? A. I don’t recall that specific statement, but it could have been said. Q. Do you recall likening Philip Morris and the cigarette industry to Winston Churchill and President Roosevelt of the United States? A. I don’t recall saying that, no. Q. Do you recall describing anti-tobacco uh advocates as the uh Germans and bad guys in World War II? A. No, I never said that. Q. You never said that? A. Not to my knowledge, no. Q. You did not, then compare the cigarette as the Allies and the anti-tobacco, public health advocates as Germans? A. No, I don’t remember saying that at all. Q. Did you recall assuring the 2,000 or so Philip Morris employees that Philip Morris would eventually win over the public health advocates in the cigarette battle? A. I don’t remember saying the public health advocates. I could have–I don’t remember saying that, but I could imagine myself having said that we would win the battle. Q. Win the battle? A. Hmm. Q. And the battle is between the cigarette industry and the public health community? A. No, I think I would say those people who are anti-tobacco, generally. Q. That would include the Surgeon General of the United States? A. Could [unintelligible]. Q. It could. Are you familiar with the Tobacco Institute’s enemies list? A. No. Q. Do you, sir, personally consider the Parent Teachers Association of the United States as an enemy of Philip Morris? A. No. Q. What about the Mormon church? A. No, I certainly wouldn’t. Q. What about the American Cancer Society? A. No, I would not. Q. The American Heart Association? A. No, I wouldn’t say they’re enemies. Q. Do you recall that a verbatim record of your speech to your employees was recorded and turned over to the Richmond Times Dispatch on or about April 24, 1996? A. No. Q. Do you recall making comments, sir about 30 past and present Philip Morris employees having been warned that they were subjects of a grand jury criminal investigation? A. No. Q. You don’t recall making comments about that? A. No, I don’t. I do know that some people were uh called to grand jury, but I don’t remember making any comments about it, no. Q. Do you recall making the precise statement that “You vowed, you, Jeffrey Bible, vowed not to “sit silently as secret research materials are leaked to the media?” A. That rings a bell, yes. Q. Have you ever heard of the Committee of Counsel? A. No. Q. Are you, are you familiar with the name Henry Ramm, R-A-M-M? A. No, never heard the name. Q. Have you seen a document produced by Philip Morris dated October 1964 in which some British scientist described the Committee of Counsel as an organization of lawyers who ran the entire United States cigarette industry, from public relations to marketing to litigation to legislation? A. No, I’ve never heard of that or seen, nor have I heard of the Committee of Counsel, so… Q. So, If there is a Secret Six, it was kept secret from you? A. Well, the [unintelligible] in ’64, is that what you said? Q. Yes. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/
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Dr. Frank Colby is a scientist and researcher who began work for RJ Reynolds in 1951 and has worked for RJ Reynolds ever since. Colby is currently president of Frank G. Colby and Associates, a consulting company funded by R J Reynolds. Q. As you sit here today, do you believe that smoking has caused the death of even one human being? A. I told–I can regurgitate my saying again and again. Q. I’m to repeat the question. As you sit here today, do you believe that smoking has caused the death of even one human being? A. Uh, probably there is one exception. Somebody uses his cigarette to burn his, his home, but not from the point of [unintelligible] health, no. Q. And your position is the same as the tobacco industry’s position, correct? Q. Objection. A. My, my, my position is that the uh connections, allegations of the connection between smoking and health are a matter of controversy. In other words, it is probably no, but we can not deny the possibility it may, there may be a connection. I mean, we regurgitate that for the 15th time. I don’t think there’s any, any need for you–you cannot coerce me into, into lying or whatever you can. Texas v. American Tobacco Co. December 19, 1997 Motley: “All right. But as far as lung cancer and emphysema, you, Frank Colby, in 1997 do not believe that a single American has ever died from lung cancer or emphysema caused by smoking cigarettes?” Colby: “In and by itself.” Motley: “By itself, all right.” Colby: “By itself, the answer is no.” Motley: “Do you know who Jeffrey Bible is?” Colby: “Yes. He is the Goldstone of Philip Morris.” Motley: “He is what?” Colby: “The Goldstone of Philip Morris.” Motley: “He’s the number one man of Philip Morris?” Colby: “That is correct.” Motley: “Do you know agree or disagree with Mr. Bible who testified when I questioned him that up to 100,000 Americans possibly die from lung cancer caused by smoking every year?” Colby: “I don’t believe Mr. Bible nor the Bible.” Motley: “You don’t believe in Mr. Bible or the Bible?” Colby: “That’s correct.” http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/
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Alexander Spears is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Lorillard Tobacco Company. Spears spent most of his life at Lorillard, having joined the company after he graduated from college in 1959. State of Texas v. The American Tobacco Co., et. al. July 24, 1997 Edward Westbrook: “Dr. Spears are you familiar with the statistics stating that approximately 3,000 teenagers start smoking every day? Spears: “I’ve seen the numbers in the press recently. That’s all I have.” Westbrook: “What do your marketing people tell you about that?” Spears: “Nothing that I can recall.” Westbrook: “Have you not asked them “Is this true or not true?” Spears: “No.” Westbrook: “Never?” Spears: “I don’t believe we’ve made this study.” Westbrook: “Is it any interest to you whether 3,000 teenagers start smoking everyday?” Spears: “It certainly has not been part of our strategy and therefore I would say it has not been of interest from a marketing perspective.” State of Florida v. American Tobacco Co. August 13, 1996 to August 14, 1996 Motley: “If I asked you to a reasonable degree of scientific probability, in your opinion has smoking cigarettes ever caused a single case of lung cancer in an American, what would your answer be?” Spears: “I don’t know.” Motley: “You don’t know whether it has?” Spears: “I don’t know.” Motley: “How many cigarettes a year does your company manufacture?” Spears: “Currently?” Motley: “Yes.” Spears: “About 40 billion.” Motley: “Forty billion? Spears: “Forty billion.” Motley: “So you continue to turn out 40 billion cigarettes a year not knowing whether cigarette smoking causes lung cancer; is that correct?” Spears: “That’s the same true– that’s true of any disease, or most of these chronic diseases. You don’t know what causes a disease.” Motley: “So you continue to sell 40 billion cigarettes a year, not knowing whether or not it causes heart disease?” Spears: “That’s correct.” Motley: “You continue to manufacture and sell 40 billion cigarettes a year, not knowing whether it causes emphysema?” Spears: “That’s correct.” Motley: “You continue to sell and manufacture and sell 40 billion cigarettes a year saying you don’t– strike that. If it were— if you were to– if some research project –” Spears: “Pick any subject I mean, I still don’t know. I mean any wild speculation wouldn’t…” Motley: “Well, does asbestos cause asbestosis?” Spears: “I think that’s well documented.” Motley: “Based on what?” Spears: “Based upon animal experiments.” Q. Do you think it has been scientifically proven, Doctor, that smoking causes any disease in anyone? A. That’s a very broad statement. I think I would need to know what the specific example is that one is talking about, as to whether it causes any disease in anyone. Smoking, like many other things, can potentially aggravate conditions that exist, so I would need to know more specifically what you’re referring to. Q. Let’s talk about lung cancer. Is it your view that smoking has been proven to cause lung cancer in any individual? A. No, that’s not my view. I don’t it has been proven to cause lung cancer. Q. All right. In your view, has smoking been proven to cause emphysema in any individual? A. No, I do not believe so. Q. Is it your view that smoking has not been proven to cause emphysema in anyone? A. Well, um, I don’t believe the exact cause of emphysema have been determined, other than in a group of people that have a [unintelligible] addiction synonymous with habit forming, uh, I think they are habit forming. Q. So, using that definition, then, you would agree that cigarettes are addictive? Report this ad A. No, I would agree that they are habit forming. I wouldn’t use the word addictive to describe that. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/
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JH63, You are approaching this quit from a place of weakness instead of from a place of authority. You can without a single fail, quit smoking and stay quit for the rest of your life. Instead of saying "I have decide to start my New Year with a new quit attempt", how about "I've made a decision to quit smoking and I pledge to never, ever take another puff of nicotine." Be bold. Speak with intent. You are now accountable to all of us here at the support group. As long as you think that nicotine has a death grip on you - you're admitting defeat. Although it's true that nicotine is very addictive, it has no power over your mind or body. Please lay out your plan to quit smoking so I can take a look at it and perhaps add my two cents. Thanks!
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Welcome aboard and congratulations, Carla! Good that you're watching Joel's videos because you'll continue to add to your chest of knowledge as well as keep your mind occupied. Always focus on the positive. Keep your quit separate and protect it from from everything else in your life.
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Happy birthday, Doreen!
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If you look at the red box, you'll notice a button which takes you to another screen where you can customize the look of the message board. I've created neutral backgrounds that you can choose from and a few other customizations as well.
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Tobacco & Smoking Documentaries
MarylandQuitter replied to MarylandQuitter's topic in Quit Smoking Discussions
Full Documentary - Death In The West: The Marlboro Story 376811460_DeathintheWestFull.mp4 -
I can't believe it's November already! NOPE!!
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Smoking isn't going to help you relieve your stress, it will only add to it! Once you see that you can get through this situation without smoking, your confidence level will go up and you'll feel like you won this battle. Once you're finished with the attorney, treat yourself to something to celebrate. Rewards work wonders.
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Panic attacks suck no matter the cause or as is often the case, no cause whatsoever. Great news that the doctor ran tests and found nothing wrong. You're not dying! If your panic attacks are from quitting smoking (which from what you've said they likely are) then pretty soon they'll go away. Whatever you do, don't even take a puff from a cigarette or use any form of nicotine (NRT, vaping etc.). Regular exercise will help with panic attacks and anxiety more than anything else. What many people find to be the most worrisome symptom when they are first quitting smoking is a general level of disorientation. The effect is usually due to a drop in blood sugar that often occurs in the first few days after quitting. The resources below gives suggestions on how to minimize the effect.
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From a post of yours from 9/19. You really enjoyed smoking. This is the big lie of being a nicotine addict. I too thought I enjoyed smoking. It wasn't until I was further along in my quit that I realized smoking made me feel horrible. After all, there was nothing enjoyable about sucking heat and poison into my lungs. "I enjoy smoking" is used to rationalize smoking. I know. I used to tell myself this.
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New quit date....Monday. 10/12/20
MarylandQuitter replied to Margeetx's topic in Introductions & About Us
Absolutely not. I read Allen Carr's book and there is nothing in it that quitters hadn't already figured out. It's enlightening when you first hear from an "official source" that smoking doesn't help you cope with stress etc., but you can get that from his promotional video. Allen Carr couldn't quit smoking until his wife made him see a hypnotist to help him quit. That is how he quit smoking. Since then, they've applied the same principals in his original book, "The Easy Way" to come out with subsequent books on quitting drinking etc. Really, the easiest way is to simply not ever take another puff - EVER. If you want to read his book, that is fine and as @jillar mentioned, you can buy it for 8 bucks. This site is 100% free and you're not even bombarded with ads, annoying or otherwise. https://whyquit.com/joels-videos/the-isolation-of-the-widowed-smoker/ -
I would pass on any alcohol until you're far enough into your quit that life is no longer a trigger for you. It may seem like triggers to smoke will always be a larger factor but they won't.
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NOPE!